This paper explores the landscape, contributions, and determinants of sovereign wealth funds' long-term investments in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study finds that of all regions, Africa receives the lowest share of investment from sovereign wealth funds, and the landscape is dominated by Asian funds. The investment strategies of sovereign wealth funds established by African countries tend to be to invest less domestically and more abroad, contrary to Asian funds. In addition, using an enriched simple mean-variance portfolio model with an exponential utility function, the analysis shows that the investment rate of return and political connections have a positive and significant effect on sovereign wealth fund investments, and risk exerts a negative but not significant effect. The paper confirms these results empirically, using a database that includes 26 sovereign wealth fund investments over 1985-2013. Hence, sovereign wealth funds investing in Africa care more about high returns and the political interests of their country of origin than the risk of their investment.
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Introduction
Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth referred to as "Africa" for simplicity) has been on a twodecades-long growth spurt and, despite the recent slowdown, the continent remains the third fastest-growing region in the world, with GDP growth averaging 4.6 percent in 2014. Africa's commodities-driven growth has interestingly been underpinned by improved macroeconomic and fiscal stability, with inflation stabilized below 10 percent in most countries, lower debt, and significantly lower fiscal and external balances. Africa's brightest prospects have led to a renewed interest from investors, most of whom have been awakened to the continent's huge infrastructure deficit. Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have also joined the bandwagon.
SWFs are government-owned investment funds set up for a variety of macroeconomic purposes. Generally speaking, there are three types of SWFs: stabilization funds, savings funds, and pension or reserve investment funds. These funds invest in natural resources as well as in infrastructure projects. While much has been said about SWFs as political investments or as stabilization mechanisms to manage growing natural resource rents, their role as a source of long-term finance for development, especially in Africa, has not been fully explored. Indeed, if SWFs could invest only 1 percent of their assets in Africa, this would amount to about $420 billion over the period 2010-2020, which would broadly correspond to the missing half of required investments in infrastructure needed to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Zoellick, 2010) . SWFs' contribution to long-term finance is critical, as traditional foreign direct investments (FDI) cannot play this role.
In this paper, we theoretically and empirically analyze SWF investments in Africa. Since SWF activities remain minimal in Africa, the question is what would it take for SWFs to contribute more to long-term financing of development in Africa? In terms of the literature, Triki and Faye (2011) count at least 15 SWFs, and analyze how African economies can benefit from SWFs and use them as a channel to tap into international financial markets. They use data taken from different sources (Sovereign brands survey, JPMorgan) to discuss the landscape of African SWFs, as well as SWF interventions on the continent, and find that African Funds are small, suffer from poor governance structures, and mainly focus on stabilizing local economies.
However, this paper does not analyze the determinants of SWF investments, nor the empirical relationship between SWF investments, economic growth and financial development. Turkisch (2011) analyzes the opportunities and barriers for SWF investments in Africa, and suggests that the introduction of SWFs in African economies facilitates up to 50 percent of the investment needed for infrastructure. However, this paper also identifies the main barriers for SWFs in Africa, which include macroeconomic risks and high volatility of returns, the lack of technological knowledge, and the size and liquidity of African economies. Moreover, the latter study did not use a theoretical model or empirical estimates to obtain these findings. This lack of studies motivated us to explore the landscape and determinants of SWF investments in Africa. In doing this, we use an enriched simple mean-variance portfolio model to derive testable results.
First, we theoretically show that the determinants of SWF investments in Africa are rate of return, risk, and networks. More precisely, we find that the rate of return has a positive and significant effect on SWF investments, while risk exerts a negative effect.
Second, we find empirically using a database of 26 SWF investments in Africa over the period 1985-2013 that: i) about half of SWF investments in Africa are commodity-fueled funds, which raises some concerns given the end of the commodity super-cycle; ii) Real Estate and Hotels are the most popular sector for SWFs in Africa, totaling 42 percent of investment, while only 10 percent of their investments are in infrastructure 1 ; iii) SWFs that invest in Africa mainly originate from Asia, and Africa is the region that received the smallest share of SWF investments.
Third, in terms of econometric specification, we regress the logarithm of the investment share on return rate, risk and networking parameters using cross-country data over the period . Our empirical results show that rate of return has a positive and significant effect on SWF investments, while volatility exerts a negative but not significant effect. Most importanly, we also find that SWFs with a political bias are more likely to invest in Africa. Our results remain robust to the introduction of the following control variables: the Linaburg-Maduell transparency index, school, inflation, macroeconomic variables (government consumption and budget balance), trade, religion, corruption, property rights, and the use of legal origin as controls.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 investigates some facts of SWF investments in Africa. Section 2 presents the econometric investigation of the determinants of SWF investments. Finally, section 3 provides policy implications and concludes.
1 Stylized facts
What do we know about SWFs in Africa?
Using data from the Sovereign Wealth Institute (SWI) transaction database, we document information on SWFs in Africa according to several variables. Table 1 shows African SWFs, their capitalization, type, and origin.
In terms of numbers, the world market share of sovereign wealth funds reached a record amount of $6,831 trillion in September 2014 (see Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute), with $4,098.6 trillion being oil and gas related, and $2,732.4 trillion for other industries and commodities.
The mean of African SWFs in terms of capitalization is $16.2 billion, with a minimum of $0.003 billion, and a maximum of $6.9 billion. The percentage of African SWFs in total capitalization represents 0.24 percent, and 0.4 percent if we take only the capitalization of SWFs related to oil and gas. This suggests that African SWFs are less capitalized than other emerging SWF countries. For example, SWFs from Asia are 40 percent capitalized, while 35 percent is capitalized in the Middle East. In column (3), we indicate the type of SWFs. The majority of African SWFs are stabilization and development funds. In terms of origin, column (4) shows that African SWFs are mostly related to oil windfalls. Following the literature, we also investigate the transparency of African SWFs, using the Linaburg-Maduell transparency index. This index, developed by Carl Linaburg and Michael Maduell, is based on 10 principles that depict SWF transparency to the public. The minimum rating takes a value of 1, while the maximum takes a value of 10. Overall, we find that African SWFs are not transparent. According to SWI, and the available data, only Nigeria's SWF is quite transparent with a value of 9, followed by Botswana's SWF with a value of 6. According to the available information taken from SWI, African SWFs are all managed by local managers.
In Table 2 To investigate SWF investments and economic growth, we use per-worker GDP data for 30
African countries over the period 2000-2013 taken from the WDI. 3 We also use private credit as a measure of the level of financial development, as well as stock market capitalization as an alternative measure to analyze the relationship between SWF investments and growth through financial development. The datasets of these variables are also taken from WDI.
SWFs that invest in Africa mainly obtain their funding from extractive industries.
47 percent of SWFs that invest in Africa obtain their finding from extractive industries, therefore 53 percent are from other sources (non-commodity).
SWFs that invest in Africa mainly originate from Asia. The investments of SWFs in Africa are dominated by Asian funds, with 49 percent of the total, followed by African funds with 38 percent (this includes Lybia and Algeria). However, the domination by Asian SWFs is due to China, which represents 48 percent. The share of investments of SWFs from the Middle East and the Americas in Africa is 6 percent, while only 1 percent of SWF investments are from Europe.
2 Istithmar Investment Fund invested in Kenya, Djibouti, Rwanda, South Africa, and Tanzania. The Mubadala Fund invested in Guinea, and Nigeria. The Brazilian SWF invested in Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola. The Chinese SWF invested in Nigeria, Sudan, Guinea, South Africa, and Ethiopia. The Singaporean SWF (Temasek) invested in Nigeria, Tanzania, and South Africa. 3 The World Development Indicators are publicly available at http://www.worldbank.org/.
Africa is the region that received the smallest share of SWF investments. In Figure   1 , in 62 projects. Only 30 percent of these investments were located domestically, with an amount of $9 billion, which corresponds to 20 projects. These findings confirm the fact that African
SWFs are more likely to invest abroad than domestically or regionally.
Do SWFs improve long-term financing and do their investments lead to growth in Africa?
We investigate the relationship between SWF investments and economic growth and long-term financing. We find that the average GDP growth rate is positively correlated to SWF investments. This suggests that countries receiving SWF investments grow faster, and that these investments positively affect economic growth. term. This implies that SWF investments affect the average growth rate in countries with a high level of financial development. To the best of our knowledge, these findings are the first in the existing literature to empirically establish a positive relationship between SWF investments, financial development, and economic growth in Africa.
The correlations among the variables are shown in Table 3 . The average GDP growth rate is positively and significantly correlated with SWF investments at the 1 percent level.
This result implies that SWF investments may increase economic growth for African countries.
The correlation between growth rate and the interaction term between SWF investments and private credit is also positive and significant at the 10 percent level, while SWF investments is negatively but insignificantly correlated with private credit. The correlation between the level of financial development measured by private credit and the interaction term is positive and statistically significant different from zero at the 1 percent level. This suggests that SWFs invest in countries with a good financial system, and the combination of these investments and the financial development increases economic growth. The Theoretical Model
In order to study the relationship between SWFs and long-term investments in Africa, we built a portfolio choice theoretical model. We assume that the manager of each SWF invests in portfolios that consist of three types of assets: two risky assets, and one risk-free asset. The first risky asset represents investments in Africa by SWFs, while the second risky asset captures investments outside Africa. LetR p be the random return on this portfolio, E(R p ) and V(R p ) be the mean and the variance of the return on portfolio, respectively. Let θ 1 , θ 2 , and θ 3 also be the percentages of a portfolio invested in Africa, outside Africa, and in risk-free assets, respectively. R 1 and R 2 , the random returns of the two risky assets, respectively. Let also R 1 and R 2 be the expected returns of the two risky assets, and R f the return of the risk-free asset. Finally, let σ 1 and σ 2 be the standard deviations of the two risky assets, respectively. We assume that there are no investment costs, and that the covariance between the two risky assets is equal to zero. Each particularly religion, affect trust in people from other countries, and that these differences in trust affect people's financial decisions. We assume that the SWF manager maximizes expected negative exponential utility and that the manager has a constant attitude towards risk:
This utility function is increasing and concave inR p , and X 1 . The Jensen inequality allows us to determine the expected negative exponential utility given by:
with
If there is no correlation between the random return of portfolio,R p , and the networking parameter X 1 , then the log-normalization directly implies that:
The objective of the manager is to maximize a modified expected negative exponential utility rate given by (3). The maximization problem becomes:
The first-order conditions directly imply that:
The percentages of portfolio θ * 1 , θ * 2 , and θ * 3 depend on the standard deviations σ 1 , σ 2 and σ X ; as well as the expected returns R 1 , R 2 , and R f and the networking parameter measured by
Result The percentage of investments in Africa, θ * 1 , depends negatively on risk in Africa, σ 1 and risk of network, σ X , but positively on excess return in Africa (R 1 − R f ) and the networking parameter, X 1 .
Proof. These properties follow directly from differentiating equation (5).
The result is quite intuitive. First, the increase in risk in Africa reduces the amount invested by SWFs. The excess return that indicates the return rate on an investment relative to the return rate on the risk-free investment increases SWF investments in Africa. It also shows that an increase in the networking parameter positively affects SWF investments in Africa.
Empirical investigation
In terms of econometric specifications, we estimate the following equation:
where i and j denote SWF and African country, respectively. θ * i,j is the share of investments of SWF i in African country j, (R 1ij − R f ) is the excess return defined as the difference between the expected returns of African country j and the risk-free asset. σ 1ij is the risk of investment in African country j. X j and Y i are country j and SWF i characteristics, respectively. ij is the error term. α 1 is the intercept and, α 2 , α 3 ,α 4 and α 5 are constant coefficients. If the rate of return on investment in Africa has a positive and significant effect on SWF investments, then α 2 should be positive and statistically significant different from zero. The risk of investment in Africa is expected to exert a negative and significant effect on SWF investments, thus α 3 should be negative. The coefficients of the networking variables, α 4 and α 5 , are also expected to have 5 See the Appendix for the derivation of equation (6) "political funds" and all others as "non political funds." They then define a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for "political fund" and 0 if not. 7 The religion variable includes the share of Christians and Muslims in a given country using the new database of the PewResearch Center. 8 In terms of control variables, we use the following variables: Private credit and bank costs to take into account the level of financial development and bank efficiency, respectively. Private credit is calculated as the credit provided by the banking sector, including all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net and bank costs are measured by overhead costs to total assets (%), defined as operating expenses of a bank as a share of the value of all assets held, and cost to income ratio (%), defined as operating expenses of a bank as a share of the sum of net-interest revenue and other operating income. 9 We also control our results using school, inflation, macroeconomic policies such as budget balance and trade taken from the World Bank WDI. 10 School is measured by the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. Inflation, consumer price index, measured by the consumer price index, reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a 6 We also use the average per-capita GDP growth rate to test the robustness of our results. 7 The database of political SWFs are from Bortolotti et al. (2015) . 8 The database are publicly available at http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/2010/number/all/ 9 The data for financial development depth and bank efficiency come from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), publicly available at http://econ.worldbank.org/. 10 The World Development Indicators are publicly available at http://www.worldbank.org/.
basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly (the Laspeyres formula is generally used); budget balance as % of GDP is cash surplus or deficit revenue (including grants) minus expenses and the net acquisition of non-financial assets. In the 1986 GFS manual, non-financial assets were included under revenue and expenditure in gross terms and trade calculated as the sum of exports (% of GDP) and imports (% of GDP). 11 Their dataset is publicly available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html and https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/icrg. 12 The database of SWF transparency measured by the Linaburg-Maduell index and capitalization are publicly available at http://www.swfinstitute.org/ 13 The list of members are publicly available at http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/states/ 
Results
This section presents the results of our specifications. The dependent variable is the logarithm plus one of the share of investments in Africa of SWF i. In each specification, we introduce the intercept, and we deal the heteroskedasticity problems in regressions by using White's consistent standard errors for statistical inference. The specifications are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
In column (1) of Table 5 level, while α 3 remains negative but insignificant. This suggests that return rate increases SWF investments, while risk does not affect these investments. The coefficients associated with the dummy variable political fund, the share of christians and muslims, enter positively and statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. These findings confirm our theoretical model and empirical strategy, and show that there are political and cultural biases for SWF investments in Africa. In column (4), we find an interesting result after controlling for the dummy variable called Islamic fund. The rate of return has a positive and significant effect on SWF investments, while risk exerts a negative and insignificant effect.
We also find that SWF investments are politically biased since the coefficient of political fund remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level. Also, the coefficient associated with the share of christians enters positively and significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.
But the dummy variable Islamic fund enters negatively and insignificantly.
To take into account the level of financial development and bank efficiency of countries in Africa, we add private credit, overhead costs and cost to income ratio as controls in columns It could be that our results are driven by human capital. To control for this fact, we add school enrollment in column (1) as a control of Table 6 . The coefficient associated with the return rate remains positive and significant at the 5 percent level, while risk remains negative and insignificant. Also, political fund remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level. As expected, human capital enhances SWF investments in Africa as the coefficient of school has a positive and significant effect on the share of investments at the 10 percent level. This suggests that SWFs tend to invest in African countries with good education system. We continue to check the robustness of our findings by adding inflation, macroeconomic policies such as budget balance, openness measured by trade, innovation captured by the proximity to the technology Note that (***, ** and * ) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. p-values are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the share of investments in Africa by an SWF. Column (1) regresses the logarithm of the investment share in Africa of an SWF on rate of return, risk and the networking parameters captured by political fund and religion (catholic, muslim and protestant). Column (2) controls for the transparency of SWFs measured by the Linaburg-Maduell index.
Columns (3) and (4) frontier, and transparency measured by corruption as controls. In column (2), we regress the logarithm of investment share of SWFs on rate of return, risk in Africa, political fund, the share of christians and muslims, and inflation. Our results show that return on investment has a positive and significant effect on SWF investment, suggesting that the rate of return enhances the investment of SWFs. The coefficient associated with risk enters negatively but is not significant. This result suggests that risk decreases the investment of SWFs in Africa. Political fund remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The share of christians enters positively and statistically significantly different from zero at 10, while the share of muslims remains negative and significant at the 10 percent level. These findings show that the excess return that indicates the rate of return on an investment relative to the rate of return on the risk-free investment increases SWF investments and that there exists political and cultural biases for these investments in Africa. Budget balance is introduced in column (3), and all coefficients of interest enter significant with the expected signs. Most importantly, the rate of return has a positive and significant effect on SWF investments at the 10 percent level. To take into account the degree of openness we control for trade in column (4). Our main results remain unchanged.
It could be that SWFs invest in countries close to the technology frontier in terms of innovation.
In addition, we add into our specifications the proximity of the country to the technology frontier (where the leader is the United States). The coefficient associated with the rate of return remains positive and significant. More specifically, the magnitude of the coefficient associated with the rate of return increases and remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level.
Also, the networking parameter captured by political motive of the fund remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that SWFs with a political bias are more likely to invest in Africa. We also find that the coefficient associated with the share of christians has a positive and significant effect on SWF investments. Interestingly, the coefficient associated with the proximity to the technology frontier also enters positively and statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. This shows that the share of SWF investments in Africa increases with the level of technological innovation. In terms of institutional variables, we use the level of corruption. The results are shown in columns (6) and (7) . The signs and significance of our coefficients of interest remain unchanged. Our main results remain robust to the introduction of inflation, macroeconomic variables, trade, corruption and the proximity to the technology frontier as controls, and confirm at the same time the results listed above, and our theoretical implications.
Conclusion and policy implications
Using available data on SWF in Africa, we observe that 47 percent of SWFs that invest in Africa are from minerals (extractive commodity), while 53 percent are from non-commodity sources.
In addition, we find that African funds invest less domestically, in contrast to Asian funds.
In addition, we show using an enriched mean-variance portfolio model that the determinants of SWF investments in Africa are excess return, risk and networks. We test our theoretical predictions empirically, using an econometric specification regressing the logarithm of the in- Note that (***, ** and * ) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. p-values are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the share of investments in Africa by an SWF. Column (1) controls for human capital measured by school enrollment. Column (2) regresses the logarithm of the investment share in Africa of an SWF on rate of return, risk, political fund, religion and controls for inflation. Columns (3) controls for macroeconomic policies captured by budget balance. Column (4) takes into account the degree of openness measured by trade. Columns (5) introduces the proximity for a given country to the world technology frontier. Column (6) uses corruption as a control variable.
vestment share of SWFs on rate of return, risk, and networking indicators using cross-country data over the period 1985-2013 for 26 SWFs. Empirical results show that rate of return has a positive and significant effect on SWF investments, while risk exerts a negative and but not significant effect. Most importantly, we find that political SWFs are more likely to invest in Africa. These results are robust to the introduction of the following control variables: the Linaburg-Maduell transparency index, the political structure of the SWF, religion, corruption, private credit, bank efficiency, and the proximity to the technology frontier.
To increase the quantity of SWF investments in Africa, policy makers should set up good governance and transparency policies by promoting a low level of corruption and high levels of property rights. African countries should reform their financial sectors by rendering their stock markets more attractive. Finally, strong governance and a higher level of coordination among public entities positively affect the efficiency and effectiveness of public investment programs. 
